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INTERNAL LAW DISTINCTIONS IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ELLIOTT

E.

CHEATHAM

The basic fact which gives rise to Conflict of Laws is the division of
the world into territorial states, with separate systems of courts and
with distinct bodies of law for handling internal or local cases. Each
system of courts and each body of law is set up and developed by a
state with an eye primarily to cases and transactions wholly within that
9tate. Men refuse, however, to confirie themselves to one state, and in
a single transaction they cut across the boundaries of half a dozen
states. The Conflict of Laws problems created by such a transaction
are usually handled by applying the law of the state deemed to have the
most important relation to the case. A rule of Conflict of Laws is
couched in two terms or sets of terms, one indicating the type of case or
problem to be decided ("validity of a contract", "procedure", "legitimacy"), the other indicating the state whose court may pass on the case
or whose law should be applied ("place of contracting", "forum",
"domicil").
The formulation of these rules of Conflict of Laws does not end the
difficulties, for the terms in which the rules are couched, of course, are
not automatic in their application.' In each novel situation where one
of the already formulated rules is urged to be controlling, the court
must determine whether the problem or case is within the rule and
must then identify the state indicated by the rule.
The problem of Classification, or "Qualification" as it is more commonly called, though much considered on the continent, has had little
attention by common-law courts and writers. Professor Lorenzen's
article2 of fifteen years ago was the first discussion of it in English.
An English writer has said: "English law and English lawyers seem
to-have been almost unaware of this important and fundamental problem of-Private International Law."3
Various methods of handling the qualification difficulty have been
"'Private international law, apart from its intrinsic difficulties, has always suffered and sometimes almost seemed to collapse through its faulty and vacillating
terminology!' Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and Remedy in the
Cases of Conflict of Laws (1935) 16 BRIT. Y. B. OF INT. LAW 20.
'The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 COL. L.
REv. 247.
1
'Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private International Law (1934) 15 BriT. Y. B. oF INT. LAW 46, 8r.
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proposed. 4 Two of the methods have this in common -the
use of
definitions already developed. The first calls for the adoption by the
forum of the content or definition of the term fixed by the Conflict of
Laws itself. At times it has been proposed that the definition employed
in the Conflict of Laws of an indicated foreign state should be used.
The proposal that the foreign definition be employed is opposed by the
writers on the subject and is rejected by the Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, Section 7 of which provides in part:" . . . in all cases where
as a preliminary to determining the choice of law it is necessary to
determine the quality and character of legal ideas, these are determined
by the forum according to its law." 5
The second method is the adoption of the content or definition of the
term worked out in-internal law. The "internal law" of a state is the
law applied to internal or local cases, cases with all their elements in the
state. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the definitions and
distinctions worked out in internal law may not be transferred uncritically and in gross to fill out the Conflict of Laws rule.5a The first
part of the paper deals with rules of Conflict of Laws containing terms
in use in internal law. The second part is concerned with situations in
Conflict of Laws as to which it is sometimes said internal law distinctions are decisive, though the formulated rules do not contain internal
law terms.
I
The introduction of internal law definitions into the rules of Conflict
of Laws will be considered in connection with the rules relating to penal
laws, public policy, and procedure.
Penal Laws. For over a century, it has been accepted that "The
courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." In determining whether a statute or a claim under it is penal within the meaning
of this rule of Conflict of Laws, the courts have frequently drawn on
characterizations of the statute in internal law cases.
Huntington, the creditor of a New York corporation, recovered a
judgment in New York against Attrill, a director of the corporation,
'CHEsHIn

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (I935) PP. 9-14.
RESTATEMENT itself

'The limitations on the rule indicated by the
considered.

are not here

aThe paper does not concern itself with the question whether the definition
of a term for one Conflict of Laws purpose may be carried over to all other purposes in Conflict of Laws.
'Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, io Wheat 66, 123 (U. S. 1825).
RESTATEMENT, CONFMICT OF LAws (934) § 6II, gives the rule as follows: "No

action can be maintained to recover a penalty the right to which is given by the
law of another state."
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because Attrill as director had falsely certified under oath that the full
amount of the capital stock had been paid in. The plaintiff relied on a
statute of New York providing that if any certificate by corporate
officers was false in any material representation, the officers executing
it should be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. In Maryland Huntington filed a bill in equity to reach property alleged to
belong to Attrill, in order to satisfy the claim under the New York
judgment. The Maryland court, assuming that the suit would not lie
7
on the New York judgment if the original cause of action was penal,
proceeded to determine whether it was penal. The decisions it reviewed
and relied on were internal law cases from New York and Maryland.
In one of the cases, the New York courts had held a similar liability
of directors fell within a statute fixing a short period of limitation as
to "an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture". In another
New York case involving the survival of a similar claim, the statement
was made that the New York courts had uniformly deemed such claims
to be "penal in character". The Maryland case cited 8 involved a Conflict of Laws question as to the enforcement in Maryland of the statutory liability of the directors of a Pennsylvania corporation, but that
case cited without discrimination internal law cases and Conflit of
Laws cases and, indeed, gave greater weight to the internal law cases.
Relying on these cases, the Maryland court held the Conflict of Laws
rule applicable and denied Huntington relief.9
Huntington filed another proceeding against Attrill in the province
of Ontario to satisfy the New York judgment. A witness testifying for
Huntington as to the New York law stated that the New York courts
deemed the statute "penal in its nature", and the Ontario court confirmed this statement through an examination of the New York cases
referred to in the preceding paragraph. On this ground, principally,
the Common Pleas Division dismissed the action.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals of Ontario was evenly divided in opinion.,- Two of
the four judges believed the characterization "penal" affixed to the
statute by the New York courts was decisive of the Canadian case, for
"those decisions are the law of the State of New York, and with that
we are dealing."' 2 The remaining judges, however, felt they were

"The assumption

seems of doubtful validity. Cf. Milwaukee County v. M. E.

White Co., 56 Sup. Ct 229, 231 (U. S. 1935); RESTATEmEXT, CoNriicr op
LAws (r934) § 444.
'First National Bank of Plymouth v. Price, 33 Md. 487 (i87o).
9Huntington v. Attrill, 70 Md. i9i (1889).
"Huntington v. Attrill, 17 Ont. Rep. 245 (1888).
'Huntington v. Attrill, i8 Ont. App. 136 (i89o).
'Burton, J. A., 18 Ont. App. 136, x5O.
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bound neither by American Conflict of Laws decisions on what is
penal in interstate cases nor by New York decisions as to the characterization of the New York statute.
"It is, with all respect, a fallacy to say that this is a mere question
of the existence, construction, or meaning of a foreign law which
is to be proved as a fact in the cause by expert testimony. The
question is one of the nature and character of the law, and that, it
appears to me, must be ultimately defined and determined by the
Courts of the country in which the action upon the foreign judgment is brought. They must be the judges of what is a foreign
penal law in the sense in which that term is applied to a law which
will, as being such, not be given effect to by them for it can hardly
be that the question whether they shall take cognizance of the action
or not is to depend upon the foreign expert's view of the nature of
the law on which the judgment has been recovered."' 3
These two judges on an independent examination were of the opinion
the New York statute was not "penal" within the meaning of the Conflict of Laws rule. But as the court was evenly divided, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed.
In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., the New York courts were asked to
enforce a death claim under a Massachusetts statute which allowed
compensation at the suit of the personal representative of the deceased
for the benefit of the family, for death occasioned by negligence, the
recovery to be not less than $5oo and not more than $io,ooo and "to
be assessed with reference to the degree of its [the defendant's] culpability." The Appellate Division, reversing the trial court, held the
4
action would not lie because the Massachusetts statute was penal.'
In reaching the result, the court relied, in part, on a Massachusetts
case which characterized the Massachusetts statute as penal.
In no one of the three cases above outlined was any real consideration
given by the court to the considerations of policy which, presumably,
underlie the Conflict of Laws rule and which should shape its application and development. On the contrary, the courts seemed "to regard
the word 'penal' as complete in itself, having always the same meaning
regardless of possible differences in the sense or purpose of its use."' 5
For this fundamental failure all three of the decisions were reversed
by the appellate courts.
The decision of the Maryland court was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, because of the denial of full faith and credit
1 Osler,

J. A., in 18 Ont. App. 136, 152-153.
(4th Dept. i916).

14172 App. Div. 227, 159 N. Y. Supp. 282

Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932)
46

E

ARv. L. REv.

i93, 2o4.
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to the New York judgment.1 6 In the opinion of that court, Mr. Justice
Gray, pointing out the variety of meanings of the word "penal",
warned "there is danger of being misled by the, different shades of
meaning allowed to the word 'penal' in our language." He then proceeded to consider
"the question whether a statute tf one State, which in gome aspects
may be called penal; is a penal law in the international sense, so
that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State."
He concluded the answer depends upon
"whether its purpose'is to punish an offence against tlie public
justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act."
Stating that the New York internal decisions could not. "be regarded
as concluding the courts of Maryland or this court, upon the question
whether this statute is a penal law in the international sense," he
concuded:
"The test is not by what name the statute is called by the legislature or the courts of the State in which it was passpd, but whether
it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it to be,
in its essenial character and effect, a punishment of an offense
against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private per-

.sori.,16a

The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal was carried to the
judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which reversed the Canadian
court. 1 7 In holding the internal law decisions of the courts of New

York, even with respect to its own statute, were not decisiv6 of the
Conflict of Laws question, Lord Watson said:
"Their Lordships cannot assent to the proposition that, in considering whetheri the present action was penal in such sense as to
oust their jurisdiction, the Courts of Ontario were bound to pay
absolute deference to any interpretation which might have been
put upon the Statute of 1875 in the State of New York. They had
to construe and apply an international rule, which is a matter of
law entirely within the cognizance of the foreign Court whose
jurisdiction is invoked."' 8
And after alluding to "the reasons which have induced courts of justice
to decline jurisdiction in suits somewhat loosely described as penal",
the court stated its opinion "that the present action is not, in the sense
of international law, penal."' 19
"Huntington v. Attrill, x46 U. S. 657
ald., at 683.

(1892).

"'Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A. C. i5o.
'AId., at 155.
"Id., at 155, 161.
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The decision of the New York Appellate Division in the Loucks
case was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 20 Judge Cardozo put with
sharpness the question before the Court:
"Penal in one sense, the statute indisputably is . . . But the
question is not whether the statute is penal in some sense. The
it is penal within the rules of private interquestion is whether
2

national law." oa
Discussing a decision with respect to the statute of Massachusetts made
b y a court of that state, he said:
"The courts of Massachusetts have said that the question is still
an open one . . . No matter how they may have characterized

the act as penal, they have not meant to hold that it is penal for
every' purpose

.

. Even without that reservation by them, the

essential2 0 bpurpose of the statute would be a question for our

COUrtS."

And speaking for a unanimous court, he held "that statute is not penal
20
in the international sense." c
These three decisions have been discussed at such length, because
they reveal in the clearest way the error inherent in the uncritical introduction of an internal law definition of a term into a Conflict of Laws
rule. Professor Beale has suggested a shift in emphasis.
"In considering the problem of extra-state enforcement of penal
law the courts have unfortunately placed the entire emphasis on
an attempt to define the meaning of the term. In most of the cases
at least it would seem that an elaboration of the reason for the rule
would not only have been more enlightening generally but also
more helpful to the court in arriving at the proper result."21
Such an examination of the reason for the rule, it is suggested in a
thoughtful article, 22 may reveal that the rule is without substantial
foundation and should be altogether rejected.
Public Policy. "A right acquired under the law of another state will
not be enforced if it is of such nature that its enforcement would contravene the public policy of the state where enforcement is sought."23
The term, "public policy", has given much difficulty in Conflict of Laws,
24
as elsewhere in the law, because of loose use and variety of meaning.
"Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. i98 (i9x8).
'cld., at io3.
nbld., at io3.
aId., at 1o2.
2BEALE, CoNFLI T or LAws (1935) § 611.3.
2Leflar, Extrastate Enforcenient of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932)
46 HARv. L. REV. 193.
'GoomIcH,

CoNFLict oF LAws (1927) p. ii.

"For an extended discussion of the use of the term in Conflict of Laws, see
note (933)

33 CoL. L. REv. 5o8.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,25 discussed above, the defendant sought
to bar the enforcement in New York of the claim under the Massachusetts death statute on the additional ground that the statute violated the public policy of the forum. The argument for the defendant
seems to have been that the death statutes of the two states were substantially dissimilar, and that the dissimilarity per se brought the case
within the public policy rule. This defense, too, was rejected by the
Court of Appeals.26 In his opinion, judge Cardozo showed that differences in internal law are not enough. On the contrary, as he pointed
out:
"The fundamental public policy [in Conflict of Laws] is perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere
main' ' 26
tained. At least, that is so among the states of the Union. a
And he restated the Conflict of Laws rule, without resorting to the
troublesome term:
"They [the courts] do not close their doors unless help would
.-violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal." 26b
The matter was concisely put, in more traditional language, by a trial
court in the same state:
.. .it does not necessarily follow that our [internal] public
policy differing from that of another State, will cause our courts
to ban contracts made under a public policy different from our
own."27
Unfortunately, later cases in the same state seem to have ignored the
special meaning of the term in-Conflict of Laws, and to have identified
it almost completely with the policy marked out by the internal law of
-the state. In Straus & Co. v. CanadianPacific Ry. Co., 2s the defendant
carrier, when sued for the loss of goods abroad, relied on a stipulation
executed abroad exempting it-from liability for theft or for negligence
of its employees. The Court of Appeals of New York, while stating
the validity of a contract is determined by the law of the place where
it is made, refused to give effect to the stipulation, on the ground it
'Supra note 20.
'One judge dissented.
aSupra note 20, at 113.
=bId., at iii.
"Thuna v. Wolf, 130 Misc. 306, 308, 223 N. Y. Supp. 765 (City Ct. I927),
.rev'd on other grounds, i32 Misc. 56, 228 N. Y. Supp. 658 (Sup. Ct 1928).
2254 N. Y. 4o7, 173 N. E. 564 (1930).
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contravened the public policy of the forum. The court, quoting from
a non-conflicts case, said:
" .. .when we speak of the public policy of the state, we mean
the law of the state, 'whether
found in the Constitution, the statutes,
'2
or judicial records. 8a
The language, it is submitted, is unfortunate; though the court may
have had in mind that the numerous statutes of the state striking down
exemptions from liability showed that such an exemption, in the language of the Loucks case, "would violate some fundamental principle
of justice." 29
In Herzog v. Stern,30 the question was whether a cause of action in
tort, which under th law of the place of the tort survived the death of
the wrongdoer, could be enforced against his domiciliary representative in New York at a time when under the New York internal law
such a cause of action did not survive. The majority of the court held
the claim could not be enforced in New York, one of the grounds of
decision being:
" . . .comity depends upon the public policy of the state, and the
Legislature had declared the public policy of this state when it provided that no action for personal injuries may be maintained
against the executors or administrators of a decedent who resided
in this state."
In the dissenting opinion by Hubbs, J., in which Pound, C. J., concurred, reliance was placed on the Loucks case, and it was emphasized
that the internal public policy of New York as delimited by the existing
laws should not be the test of the application of the rule of Conflict
of Laws. Indeed, if there were such an identification of the terms,
"rules in Conflict of Laws calling for the application of foreign law
' 31
. . . would be practically nullified.

Procedure. "All matters of procedure are governed by the law of
the forum. '3 2 This rule is never questioned, but there is wide disagreement as to what are matters of procedure. Professor Cook in a notable
article3 3 showed that the contrasting terms, "substance" and "procedure", are used to mark numerous distinctions in the law, eight of
which he enumerated, each distinction having its own special legal

'ald.,

at 413.

is lent to this explanation of the case by the fact that the judge who
wrote the opinion in the Loucks case concurred in the opinion in the Straus case.
1264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (i934).
mGOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 23, pp. li-I2.
"RETATEmENT, CoNFLlcT OF LAWS (1934) § 585.
"'Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (933) 42 YAIE L. 3.
333.
'Support
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consequence and resting on special considerations of policy. If a particular matternhas been characterized as "procedure" in a case involving
one of these purposes, may that characterization be carried over uncritically and furnish the ready-made solution to the Conflict of Laws
problem? In some decisions, this has been done.
In Levy v. Steiger,3 4 there was an action in Massachusetts for a tort
cqmmitted in Rhode Island. The question was whether a.forum statute
creating a presumption of due care on the part of the plaintiff in a
negligence case was applicable to a suit on a foreign tort. The court,
after repeating the Conflict of Laws rule as to procedure, stated it had
been settled by an earlier decision in Massachusetts that the statute
affected matters'0 f procedure. In the case referred to the court had
stated, it is true, that the statute "affects procedure"; but the case in.olved only the question of the constitutionality of the statute'in application to a Massachusetts transaction.
An analogous use of a non-conflicts decision is found in the leading
case of Leroux v. Brown.35 The Court of Common Pleas held the
fourth section of the English Statute of Fraudssa should be applied
in an action in England on a French contract, because the language of
the section, "No action shall be brought," and the ability to satisfy
the statute by a writing subsequent to the contract, indicated the
statute went to the "remedy" rather than the "right". In support of this
conclusion, Jervis, C. J., cited the opinions in two non-conflicts cases
to the effect that the section merely takes away the remedy.
The 'easy transfer to the Conflict of Laws cases of the result in the
non-conflicts cases was induced by the identity of the terms used, "procedure" or "remedy". But the identity should not conceal that the
question's in the two classes of cases are different and that each question
is to be considered in the light of the particular issue involved. This
has been so fully demonstrated in the article by Professor Cook 36 and
so clearly made by other writers3 7 that it will not be labored here.
Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (I919).
asI2 C. B. 8o1 (1852).
II, c. 3 (1677).
"Supra note 33.
'"The term 'procedure' may have one meaning in matters *ofinternal law, and
a narrower meaning from the point of view of the Conflict of Laws. A precedent
for this has been furnished us by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
matter of 'penal' laws ...The wide meaning given to the term 'procedure' in the
Conflict of Laws has already done much mischief. Our courts would do well to
keep in mind the real meaning of the rule that all matters of procedure are
governed by the local law of the forum." Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and
the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 310, 330, 332.
"It cannot be safely assumed that the distinction between right and remedy
adopted for other purposes, is always applicable in conflicts cases." McClintock,
Substance and Procedure in Conflict of Laws (193o) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933,
942. See also note (1933) 47 HAv. L. Ray. 315.
"233

"29 CAR.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws in the Introductory Note to
its Chapter'on Procedure inferentially rejects, as do these writers, the
blind use of definitions worked out in connection with other questions.
After stating the importance of employing when practicable the law of
the place of the transaction, and giving the reasons of policy for the
Conflict of Laws rule as to the use of the law of the forum in certain
situations, the Introductory Note continues: When "administration of
the foreign law by the local tribunals [is] impracticable, inconvenient,
... the local rules of the forum are applied and are classified as matters of procedure." The same thought is elaborated by Professor Beale
in his recent treatise. 38 In each Conflict of Laws case, therefore, in
which the rule as to procedure is invoked, it ig for the court to determine whether the administration of foreign law is "impracticable,
inconvenient."
The'situations so far considered are the simplest ones in Conflict of
Laws. The question before the courts, in a case as to a penal law or
public policy, is whether the court will assume jurisdiction over the
controversy; in a case as to procedure, whether the court will apply
the forum law despite the foreign elements of the transaction sued on.
In some of the cases criticized above, the court used the characterization
of the statute or element given in internal law cases of the state of the
transaction; in others, the court employed the characterization given in
its own internal law cases. But the more carefully considered cases
make clear that neither internal law characterization can be transferred
to the Conflict of Laws case. The decision how to handle internal transactions has inevitably been made wholly without regard to any foreign
element, for no such element was present and any consideration of it
would have been misplaced. The rules of law and the terms they embody are formulated without regard to the Conflict of Laws question.
In the Conflict of Laws case, however, the court is faced with a new
question - What effect shall be given to the foreign elements? The
considerations which dictate the answer to that question may be of a
different kind from those shaping the relevant rule of internal law. In
brief, internal law definitions can not be imported without examination
into Conflict of Laws rules.
II
The situations considered in this subdivision of the paper are more
complicated, as the transactions in question have contacts with several
states and the problem is to determine which contact or group of
M

BEAIj, CONFLIcT or LAws (1935)

§

584.1.

580
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contacts is decisive for the choice of law. The choice of law rules are
rarely phrased in terms employed in internal rules. Nevertheless,
internal law distinctions are frequently urged as decisive, and the question here considered is whether these distinctions may be taken over
as the appropriate distinctions for the problems of Conflict of Laws.
Property. In Conflict of Laws property is divided into two kinds,
"immovables" and "movables". The law governing the validity of a
will, for example, differs with the kind of property, a will of immovab'les being governed by the law of the place of the land and a will of
movables by the law of the domicil of the decedent at death. 39 In drawing the line between the two kinds of property for Conflict of Laws
purposes, shall the court follow the line marked out in internal law
between realty and personalty?
The internal law line was followed by the New York Court of Appeals in Despardv. Churchill.40 In holding that a devise of a New York
leasehold was governed by the law of the decedent's domicil, California,
the court discussed the case wholly in terms of "realty" and "personalty"
and relied on internal law cases for the conclusion that the leasehold
was a chattel real.
The Chancery Division, however, rejected this method in a case
concerning alleged equitable conversion through a direction in a will
to convert English freeholds into money.41 In determining the law
governing the descent of the property on the death intestate of the
beneficiary under the will, the court said:
"The distinction between real estate and personal estate under
English law has nothing to do with the question. The alternatives
and the only alternatives for consideration are immovable property
or movable property . . . the fact that [certain property] is regarded as personal estate for certain purposes in questions between
our fellow subjects here has no bearing on the question whether
as a movable or not in quessuch a mortgage should be regarded
'41
tions of international law." a
Torts. In a few cases, the defendant in one state, State X, is asserted
to be liable under the internal law of another state, State Y, for the
tortious act of an alleged agency or instrumentality in the latter state.
Whether the relation of the defendant in X to the act in Y is such that
the law of Y may be applied is a question of Constitutional Law;
whether the relation of the defendant to the act is such as to make the
law of Y applicable is a question of the common law of Conflict of
"RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

'053 N. Y. 192 (1873).
"In re Berchtold, [1923]
"aId., at 200.

I Ch. 192.

(1934) §§ 249, 306.
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Laws. Can these questions of Constitutional Law and of Conflict of
Laws be answered by first determining whether under the doctrines
of causation in the law of torts the defendant would be liable in a wholly
internal case in X or in Y? In two recent cases, the matter has been
considered.
In Young v. Masci,42 the owner of an automobile lent it in X (New
Jersey) to a friend, with permission, as the court found, to drive to Y
(New York). While in Y, the borrower negligently struck the plaintiff.
The present action was brought in X by the injured party against the
owner of the car to recover under a Y statute which made the owner
of a motor vehicle liable for injuries resulting from negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle by any person operating it with the permission of the owner. The Court of X found the defendant liable and
he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Counsel for
the defendant based his argument on the fact that under the X law
a lender of an automobile was not liable for negligent injuries inflicted
by the borrower in its operation. This immunity of the lender created
by the law of the state where the lender acted must continue, so it was
argued, when the car is taken into another state, and to use the internal
law of the second state 'to impose liability on the lender was, it was
said, a violation of the contract clause and of due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. So, "the essential question", as the court put
it, was "the power of New York to make the absent owner liable personally for the injury inflicted within the state by his machine." The
Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the X court, held the Y
statute could constitutionally be applied to the X owner.
"When Young gave permission to drive his car to New York,
he subjected himself to the legal consequences imposed by that
state upon- Balbino's [the borrower's] negligent driving as fully
as if he had stood in the relation of master to servant . . . The
power of the state to protect itself and its inhabitants is'42not limited
by the scope of the doctrine of principal and agent. a
The counsel for the plaintiff had argued that the Y law was properly
applied, even if the defendant had not permitted the bailee to take the
car into Y, saying:
"Assuming that Young did not know at the time he lent his car
that the bailee intended to take the car to New York, nevertheless
he consented to the operation of the laws of New York because
having lent his car for a day he was bound to know that the one to
whom he lent it might go outside the state of New Jersey, and he
his bailee
took his risk of what the law of
43 those states to which
would take his car might be."
'2289

U. S. 253 (1933).

Iald., at 258.

11Brief of the appellee, P. 5.

582

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

The Supreme Court, however, did not find it necessary to pass on the
contention, and expressly left open the question of the general test.
Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"We have no occasion to decide where the line is to be drawn
generally between conduct which may validly subject an
absent
43
party to the laws of a state and that which may not." a
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it necessary to pass on a contention similar to the one quoted from the plain44
tiff's brief in Young v. Masci. In Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,
a sales agent of the defendant, with territory in New York and Pennsylvania only, drove into Ontario in an automobile furnished by his employer. The plaintiff, a guest of the sales agent, was severely injured
while in Ontario through the alleged negligent operation of the car.
A statute of Ontario somewhat similar to the New York statute above
outlined made the owner of a motor vehicle liable for damage suffered
by reason of negligence in its operation unless the vehicle was in the
possession of some one without his consent. In an action under the
Ontario statute against the employer, in which the plaintiff recovered
a large verdict, the District Court "ruled that the defendant might be
liable even though it had not authorized Clemens [the sales agent] to
go into the province at all."'45 On appeal, this ruling was held error,
L; Hand, Circuit Judge, saying:
"It is clear that the defendant did not give him authority to go
to Canada merely by giving him the car. Unless more than that
was shown, the law of Ontario could not reach the defendant. ' 46
Though no constitutional limitation seems to have been invoked by
the defendant, the court, discussing Young v. Masci, supra, said the
opinion in that case "should read equally as one on constitutional law,
or on the conflict of laws."
"It is true that the only point there before the Supreme Court
was of the constitutionality of the New York statute; formally
there is a distinction between that, and whefher New Jersey ought
to have raised a liability-a question of New Jersey law. But the
same considerations determine both questions. The Fourteenth
Amendment would protect the owner only in case he had no means
of avoiding liability; when he chose to intervene by proxy in New
York no such injustice resulted as made constitutional the action
of New Jersey in holding him liable. Precisely the same reasons
ought to determine whether New Jersey
should raise up a liability,
' 46
analogous to that of New York.

a

aSupranote 42, at 260.

"68 F.

(2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).

"Id., at 944.

"Ibid.

"&Ibid.
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The court then proceeded to determine whether the employer would be
immune from liability, "if it [the employer] had authorized Clemens
to take the car to Ontario, but if his errand in this instance had still.
not been within the scope of his authority; that is, whether the Ontario
law might impute his wrong to the defendant rherely from sending
him into the province." On this the court held that if the defendant
sent its agent to that province, the Ontario law could be applied to the
defendant, even as to damages "too remote under ordinary principles."
These two cases taken together indicate that the internal law test of
causation or liability is not to be used as the Conflict of Laws test of
the necessary relation of the defendant to the harmful act in State Y.
The Supreme Court rejected the causation or liability test set by the
internal law of X. The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the causation
or liability test set by the internal law of Y.
Contracts. There is much disagreement and confusion as to the law
that governs the validity of a contract. One rule which has the support
of high authority 47 is that the "place of contracting" governs. The
place of contracting--"place of making" is frequently used as a synonym-is the place in which occurs the last act necessary, under the
48
law of contracts, to make a contract.
"It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, to determine where
the contracts upon which this action is brought were made . . .
When did the transactions become obligatory upon the parties as
contracts? In other words, when were the notes delivered to the
company, so as to invest it with the legal right of enforcing payment according to their terms; and when did the company become
bound to the defendant, as an insurer. The answer to these questions involves
the solution of the inquiry where the contracts were
49
made."

It results that the rules of Contract law are carried bodily over into
Conflict of Laws and are made decisive. This method of dealing with
the Conflict of Laws question, through identifying the Contracts question, "when", with the Conflict of Laws question, "where", has often
been criticized.50 It is unlikely that the same considerations of policy
which induce a court to formulate a rule that a contract is complete at
'RESTATEmET, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 332; BEArx, COFxLICT OF LAWS

(1935)

§ 332.
RESTATEmENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 311, Comment d, §§ 312-331.
"Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266, 27o (I85O). Cf. Shelby Steel Tape Co. v.

"See

Burgess Gun Co., 8 App. Div. 444, 448, 4o N. Y. Supp. 87I (4th Dept. I896).
'Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (I92i)
30 YALE L. J. 565, 655, (1921) 3 YALE L. J. 53; Heilman, $,dicial Method and
Economic Objections in, Conflict of Laws (934) 43 YALE L. J. 1082.
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a certain time are necessarily decisive considerations for the choice of
law. "Many [continental] writers deny that the rules relating to the
completion of contracts by correspondence from the point of view of
time can be rationally invoked for the solution of the problem from the
standpoint of the conflict of laws." 5' But if the considerations of policy
for the two questions are not identical, the incorporation of the Contracts result into the Conflict of Laws rule means that the considerations appropriate to the Conflict of Laws problem are ignored, and the
judge in the Conflict of Laws case has surrendered his power of decision to the judge in the Contracts case.
An example of the blurring of issues through the identity of terms
occurs, it is believed, in the recent case of Weissmann v. Banque de
Bruxelles.52The action was brought by the assignees of a New York
corporation to recover from a Belgian bank the proceeds of a check
drawn on the Treasury in Washington in favor of the corporation.
The check had been indorsed by the corporate president and deposited
in the Belgian bank for collection for his personal use without authority
of the corporation. The Belgian bank collected it in Washington
through its correspondent bank, and allowed the president of the corporation to withdraw the proceeds for his own use. The unusually
interesting opinion53 considered at length whether the law of the place
where the check was delivered to the defendant should govern, but
rejected that law because, as it said, the deposit for collection made
the bank the "agent" of the depositor.
"When the defendant bank accepted the check for collection for
Bensuade, it became his banking agent. When it went outside the
jurisdiction to collect the check for him, as it did when it sent the
check to Washington for collection there, it was in the same position as if it had sent its agent to New York to collect for the corporate official a check drawn on a New York bank payable to the
corporation.
The law of New York would govern the trans54
action."
Here the Court carried over into Conflict of Laws a characterization
of the deposit-for-collection situation applied in non-conflicts cases. 55
In non-conflicts cases, however, there has been much disagreement as
to how such a situation can best be characterized. It has been called
'Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws

(1920)

20 COL. L. REv. 247, 253.
1254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (930).
'Delivered by Pound, J.
"Id., at 495.
'The Court did not consider whether the characterization of the transaction
by the Belgian law should govern because Belgium was the place where the defendant received the check.
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"purchase", "bailment", "trust", and "agency". 6 A writer who has
considered the problem with thoroughness objects to the exclusive use
of any one of the terms or characterizations even in non-conflicts
situations.
"The chief objective [of the courts] appears to be to write in
successive casts, although involving wholly different issues, a selfconsistent statement of the law, following the supposed implications of the descriptive terms 'agency' or 'purchase', depending
upon which may have been first used in the state . . . to attempt
to sum up the contract in the one word 'agency' is to . . . allow
an incidental matter, one of importance only in the unusual case,
to outweigh all other elements of the transaction . . . It would be
preferable to disregard the terms 'purchase' and 'agency' altogether and recognize that a broader formula is needed to serve as
a rule of decision . . . While this may seem like attempting to
blow both hot and cold at the same time, it is only so on the assumption that either 'purchase' or 'agency' as usually understood must
serve as a starting point. To57make such an assumption is to allow
words to dictate decisions."
Since there is disagreement on the appropriate characterization of the
transaction even for non-conflicts purposes, it seems unsuitable to use
a particular non-conflicts characterization as decisive of the Conflict
of Laws case.
ConstitutionadLimitations. The extent of the control of the Constitution over choice of law is now in the process of development. In the
course of the development, it is important that the essential nature of
the problem be not obscured by confused terminology or by the use
of misplaced concepts of internal law.
Conflict of Laws by its very nature deals with interstate and international cases. The federal control of the subject is part of the broad
control of the central government over matters of interstate and international concern, illustrations of which are found in the interstate
commerce clause and the treaty clause, and in the privileges and immunities clauses. In parts of this field, as in determining the extent
of federal power 8 or the limits of state power over interstate commerce, the court has refused to be bound by the niceties of private law.
When support for a municipal ordinance which actually burdened
interstate trade was offered by an argument as to the time of the passage of title to the goods affected by the ordinance, Mr. Justice Holmes

"See

ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS (2d ed. I93I) p. 72, n.; CosTIGAN, CASES oN

TRUSTS (1925) pp. lO3, n., III, n.
'Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper as "Purchases" (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
874, 897, 901, 902. Cf. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (935) §§ 22-24.
'Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
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brushed aside the argument, saying: "'Commerce among the several
states' is a practical conception, not drawn from the 'witty diversities'
(Yel. 33) of the law of sales." 59
Unfortunately, the court has at times embraced the petty complexities of Contract law in its control of Conflict of Laws. In two well known
cases, New York Life Insurance Co, v.Dodge,60 and Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Liebing,6 ' the facts and issues were strangely alike.
In each case, a Missouri policy holder had borrowed on his life policy
from a New York insurancelcompany, the funds to be loaned being forwarded from New York to Missouri. When the loan was not paid at
maturity the insurance company had in each case appropriated the
reserve to satisfy the loan, as it had the right to do under the law of
New York and the provisions of the loan agreement. The common
question in the two cases was whether a Missouri statute which forbade such an appropriation of the reserve and directed its use to another
end, could constitutionally be applied to the loan. In the first of the
cases'the Supreme Court by a five-to-four decision held the Constitution prevented the application of the Missouri statute, as the loan contract was made in New York. In the second case the Court unanimously held the Missouri statute could be applied, because the loan contract
was made in Missouri. In the latter case Justice Holmes distinguished
the earlier case because of a very slight difference in the policy provisions concerning the loan.
"The policy now sued upon contained a positive promise to
make the loan if asked, whereas, in the one last mentioned, it might
be held that some discretion was reserved to the company. For
here the language is, 'the company will . . . loan amounts within

the limits of the cash surrender value,' etc., whereas there it was
'cash loans can be obtained'. On this distinction the Missouri court
seems to have held that, as soon as the application was delivered
to a representative of the company in Missouri, the offer in the
policy was accepted and the new contract complete, and therefore
subject to Missouri law. If, however, the application should be
regarded as only an offer, the effective acceptance of it did not take
place until the check was delivered to Blees [the borrower], which
' 62
again was in Missouri, where he lived."

"

"Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 2o3 U. S. 507, 512 (19o6). Cf. the language of
Hughes, C. J.: "We do not regard that question [of the power of Congress to
lay a tax upon the compensation of officers] as answered by mere terminology.
The roots of the constitutional restriction strike deeper than that." Helvering v.
Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 224 (1934).
'246 U. S. 357 (1918).

U. S. 209 (1922).
'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing, supra note 6I, at 213-214.
'259
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This slight difference in language led to the result that in the Dodge
case the loan contract was consummated in New York, while in the
Liebing case the loan contract was complete when the indicated acts
were done in Missouri and therefore it was made in Missouri; and as
the opinion concludes, "the Constitution and the first principles of legal
thinking allow the law of the place where a contract is made to deter63
mine the validity and the consequences of the act."
In an earlier case, the same justice had used somewhat similar language in a cryptic opinion in a tort case. 64 In all of these cases the court
seems to have treated as dominant a single element, as, place of
making or place of wrong. This method of treatment, which might
make all Conflict of Laws a part of Constitutional Law, 65 has met with
strong opposition in the court itself. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the dissenting opinion in the Dodge case 66 pointed out that most of the acts
done in the making of the loan contract were done in Missouri, not in
New York, and that "it should, if facts are allowed to control,67 be
held to have been made in Missouri." In this insistence on control by
the facts, the justice was evidently rejecting the formal place of contracting6" as the appropriate test. Again, he urged that even though
New York be deemed the place of making, nevertheless the Missouri
statute could constitutionally be applied to the loan transaction.
"Even if the rules ordinarily applied in determining the place
of a contract required this court to hold, as a matter of general
law, that the loan agreement was made in New York, it would not
necessarily follow that the Missouri statute was unconstitutional,
because it prohibited giving effect in part to the loan agreement.
.. . The test of constitutionality to be applied here is that commonly applied when the validity of a statute limiting the right of
contract is questioned, namely: Is the subject-matter within the
reasonable scope of regulation? Is the end legitimate? Are the
means appropriate to the end sought to be obtained? If so, the act
must be sustained, unless the court is satisfied that it is clearly an
arbitrary and unnecessary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty."sa
He found the Missouri contacts with the transaction made~it entirely
reasonable for Missouri to apply its law to the transaction.
In later cases, the court has refused to single out any one element as
by itself controlling, but has grouped the factually important elements
11d., at 214.
"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown,

'See

234 U. S. 542 (1913).
RESTATm&ENT, CoNFLicr oF LAws, § 43, Comment to Caveat.

"Supra note 6o.
"rItalics by the author.
'See supra pp. 583-585.

"Supra note 6o, at 382.
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for the purpose of showing that a substantial relation of a state to a
transaction makes it appropriate to apply the state's law. In explaining
the lack of power of the State of Texas to apply its law for the determination of rights under an insurance policy, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
now speaking for the whole court, said:
"But in the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy
sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas .. .Texas was, therefore, without
power to affect the terms of contracts so made." 69
And explaining earlier cases, the opinion continued:
"The division of this court in the Tabacos and Dodge Cases was
on the question of fact whether there were in those cases things
done within the state which the state could properly lay hold as
the basis of the regulation there imposed .. .In the absence of
any such things, as in this case, the court was agreed that a state
is without power to impose either public or private obligations on
contracts
made outside of the state and not to be performed
70
there."
Mr. Justice Roberts, also speaking for the whole court in another
case, held the statute of the forum could not be applied to a contract
entered into elsewhere, "if, as here, the interest of the forum has but
slight connection with the substance of the contract obligations." And
he condemned a state policy which attempt to draw to the forum control
over contracts elsewhere consummated "regardless of the relative
importance of the interests of the forum as contrasted with those cre71
ated at the place of the contract.1
In recent cases, the essential character of constitutional control in
this field of interstate relations has been pointed out, with the Supreme
Court the arbiter under the Constitution to determine the permissible
field of application of the laws of the several states, each of which may
seek to press outward its asserted sphere of control to the point of
2
serious conflict with the interests of others.7
In the late case of Alaska Packers'Association v. IndustrialAccident
Commission of California," the matter was considered at length. A
'Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,

281 U. S.397, 407, 408 (1930).
"'Id., at 4o8, n. The Tabacos case referred to in the quotation is Compania
General De Tabacos v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U. S. 87 (1927), involving the power to levy a tax with respect to foreign insurance contracts.
'Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143
(1934).
'Brandeis, J., in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 146 (1932);
Stone, I., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933) ; Stone,
J., in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 229 (1935).
"294 U. S. 532 (i935).
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Mexican, who had in California entered into a contract to work for a
season in a canning factory in Alaska and was there injured, had been
awarded compensation under the California Workmen's Compensation
Act by the state tribunals of California. The employer urged that the
application of the California statute was a violation of the due process
clause, and that the failure to apply the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act, which the employee in his contract had elected to have apply,
was a violation of the full faith and credit clause. Mr. Justice Stone,
writing for a unanimous court, held that both objections failed. In his
outline of the relevant factors he listed elements that have rarely been
referred to by the courts in formulating the common law rules of Conflict of Laws, as, the improbability that the injured employee, a migratory worker in a strange land, would be able to apply for compensation
in Alaska, and the danger that the employee when brought back to
California by the employer would become a public charge, "both matters of grave public concern to the state." As to the objection based
on the due process clause, he said:
"California, therefore, had a legitimate public interest in controlling and regulating this employer-employee relationship in
such fashion as to impose a liability upon the employer for an
injury suffered by the employee, and in providing a remedy available to him in California . . .Indulging the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every state statute, we cannot say
that this one, as applied, lacks a rational basis or involved any
unreasonable exercise of state power."73a
As to the objection under the full faith and credit clause the justice
stated that the decision was to be made "by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight." He said there was no adequate reason for
finding "that, in the conflict of interests which have found expression
in the conflicting statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior to that of
California."
CONCLUSION
Two closely related practices believed to be unfortunate have been
discussed, - the uncritical transfer to Conflict of Laws of the meaning
given to a term in internal law, and the use of a distinction worked out
in internal law as decisive of an issue in Conflict of Laws without adequate consideration of whether the internal law distinction is appropriate to the other issue.
It is well to mention two other matters which are foreign to the
article. First,it is not urged that all doctrine be rejected in Conflict of
Laws. The suggestion is that the development of doctrine be based' on
WId., at 542.
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perception of the considerations of policy relevant to the problem in
hand, unobstructed by confusion of terminology and inappropriate distinctions.74 Second, it is not proposed that the internal law be ignored.
After the state with the dominant Conflict of Laws contacts with a
transaction has been determined, the internal law of that state will
ordinarily be used. Indeed, the use of the internal law may be enjoined
on the courts by provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
as, the full faith and credit clause with respect to public acts. Even in
the process of determining the state of dominant contacts, attention will
naturally be given to the factors shaping the internal law. It would be
ruinous to the development of Conflict of Laws if its problems were
considered in isolation from the related internal law cases. Conflict of
Laws cases as to Contracts or as to Family Law are primarily cases
as to Contracts or Family Law, with the interstate or international
comnplexity added. As it is the task of the judge in the ordinary case
in Contracts or Family Law to develop a body of law satisfactory for
the purposes of commerce or the family inside the state, so it is the task
of the judge when the interstate or international element is added to
develop a body of law satisfactory for those same purposes in an interstate and international society. In the process of this development, however, the judge must give weight to the new element uncoerced by
internal law terms and distinctions.
The decision of cases in Conflict of Laws may proceed through the
selection of a single contact or factor as by itself properly determining
the state whose law is to govern. 75 The courts, however, may be unwilling to select a single element as by itself controlling. In many cases
the governing law has been determined according to the grouping or
massing of factors deemed dominant for the purpose in hand.7 6 The
selection of a single governing factor or the choice of the dominant
group of factors can wisely be made in Conflict of Laws only if the
courts refuse to use inappropriate definitions and distinction of internal
law.
"'Cf. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L.

Q. 156; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (i933) 47 HAx.v.
L. REv. 173.
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